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Introduction 
 
The fairly recent interest in the concept [1] of public sphere [2] and perhaps even the 
use of the phrase itself in English stems from the publication in 1989 of the 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of 
Bourgeois Society [3], a translation of Jürgen Habermasřs Struckturwandel der 
Öffentlichkeit, originally published in 1962. Oversimplifying, the function of the ideal 
Habermasian public sphere was public opinion generation through rational critical 
thinking and debate. Concomitantly, deliberation itself is the very foundation for a 
consummately open and participatory society. Habermas (1997: 105) defines the 
concept of public sphere as follows: ŖA domain of our social life where such a thing as 
public opinion can be formed [where] citizens…deal with matters of general interest 
without being subject to coercion…[to] express and publicize their views.ŗ 
Consequently, citizens must continually and voluntarily come together to exchange 
perspectives on matters of mutual political interest. Habermas traces the 
development of the public/private dichotomy from ancient Athens to modernity, but 
his emphasis is on the enlightment bourgeoisieřs conceptualization of a public 
sphere, and how this ideal has been eroded in modernity. In Habermasřs view, in the 
modern era, a social-structural transformation has taken place. Although the 
original public sphere was limited to propertied and educated males, over time, the 
ideals of equality embedded in constitutions, empowered various groups in their 
struggle for access and voting rights. Thus the role of the state expanded. The 
tendency toward a mutual infiltration of public and private sphere, the erosion of the 
public sphere, the Řre-feudalizationř of the public sphere, as the process has also been 
called, could no longer be stopped.  
According to Habermas, the enlightment bourgeoisie believed only matters of 
public concern needed to be discussed, because the private sphere markets and the 
intimate sphere of family were self-regulating. Further on, Habermas shows that 
when private people come together to make public use of their reason, they must all 
share the same societal and cultural values and norms, the same formal educational 
background. They must not be tainted by outside influence as it might interfere with 
their views.  
To Habermas such a sphere can be only one, one in which civil discourse is 
coupled with discursive reasoning devoid of emotion and spectacle. In this respect, 
Habermas moves away from the ancient Greek concept of public sphere and the 
Socratic model of deliberative democracy, where the central function of reason was to 
cultivate human constructive emotions. On the other hand, ancient Athenians also 
recognized the elements of spectacle and show which were seen as an integral, 
harmless part of the process of the social gathering and human interaction. 
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While I embrace Habermasřs conviction that the keys to an evolving democracy 
are participation and engagement, I reject his over-selective criteria for what makes 
a public sphere most effective an instrument for democratic advancement. 
Consequently, in counterpoint to the ideal described and suggested by Habermas, I 
argue that: 
1. the public sphere needs to develop a nexus of several coexisting public spheres 
that would fulfil the ever-changing needs of the contemporary heterogeneous society 
we live in (see Popa in press). The formal vs. informal public sphere, the elitist vs. 
cultural public sphere are just a few examples of such competing public spheres that 
are dealing with the elite but also with the minorities, with formal but also with 
informal forms of participation and socio-political engagement; 
2. reason cannot possibly be separated from our emotions due to their 
interdependent relationship. However, I claim that emotions, be they constructive or 
destructive are essential ingredients of an evolving democracy as they lead, in time, 
to paradigm shifts of our thinking through positive and negative emotional 
experimentation. Emotional expression is, according to Habermas, potentially 
damaging as the logic of the life-world has the potential to disrupt the procedures of 
deliberation. However, emotional expression plays an important role in 
authenticating the accounts of participants and in information diffusion. Moreover, 
affective communication contributes to public participation, expression and 
engagement, thus having a democratizing role. Dahlgren (1995: 109) notes that 
Ŗrational communication is necessary, but if our horizons do not penetrate beyond 
the conceptual framework of communicative rationality and the ideal speech 
situation, we will be operating with a crippled critical theory.ŗ 
 
 
1. An alternative for the mass public: the cultural public sphere 
 
One of the underlying assumptions of Habermasřs (1962/1989) work on the public 
sphere is that the proliferation of a multiplicity of competing publics is necessarily a 
step away from, rather than toward democracy and that a single, comprehensive 
public sphere is always preferable to a nexus of multiple publics. 
In 1992, Nancy Fraser sets out to prove that such an assumption is not standing 
in present-day stratified democratic societies. One of the most important features of 
the public sphere, such as it was described and prescribed by Habermas, is equality 
in participation. Yet, stratified societies are based on an institutional framework 
that generates unequal social groups in structural relations of dominance and 
subordination. Therefore, Fraser (1992: 122) rightly points out that Ŗ(…) in such 
societies, full parity of participation in public debate and deliberation is not within 
the reach of possibility.ŗ In consequence, she concludes by saying that Ŗa plurality of 
competing publics better promote the ideal of participatory parity than does a single, 
comprehensive, overarching public.ŗ Counterpublics having an emancipatory 
potential and force and competing publics that permit contestation is the solution 
proposed by Fraser in the particular case of contemporary post-capitalist societies. 
The cultural public sphere is such a competing public sphere. McGuigan [4] 
(2005: 435) identifies the cultural public sphere as the late-modern world version of 
the 18th century literary public sphere [5]. Instead of dealing with classical, modern 
or even postmodern Řseriousř art, the contemporary cultural public sphere focuses on 
Ŗ(…) the various channels and circuits of mass-popular culture and entertainment, 
the routinely mediated aesthetic and emotional reflections on how we live and 
imagine the good life.ŗ (ibid) 
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Such an approach to the public sphere is in direct opposition to the Habermasian 
thinking that advocates rational-critical debate (see Popa in press). For Habermas, 
emotion and emotional expression are distracting and only critical discussion can 
really be rational. Moreover, Habermas (1989: 248 and 1997: 106) claims that solely 
critical rational discussion can really be public and lead to deliberation. 
As far as contemporary world is concerned, Habermas strongly believes that the 
public sphere has been hopelessly eroded. This is mainly due to the irremediable 
change in the importance, value and reality of things that pertain to the content of 
todayřs issues at stake (the first two ones), and also to the interaction and 
participation [6] (the last one). As a more specific example, we could mention here 
womenřs traditional concerns about domestic, emotional and relationship issues. In 
Habermasian terms, the question that needs to be addressed in this particular case 
is whether such concerns should be recognized or, rather, we are bluntly suggested 
that such concerns are not to be recognized as worthy of public discussion. The 
cultural public sphere is precisely that: a public sphere concerned with the practices 
of mundane existence and with the pleasures and pains of the contemporary good 
life, that together capture popular attention. Synthesizing, the three main features 
of the cultural public sphere are: 1) it is individual concerned; 2) it is non-restrictive; 
3) it is emotion-dependent. 
As shown above, the cultural public sphere is, unlike the ideal Habermasian 
public sphere, concerned with ordinary peopleřs everyday lifeword situations and 
also how to negotiate their way in and through their countryřs socio-political 
systems. 
 By being non-restrictive public sphere, it allows everybody to join: women and 
majorities of all kinds that have otherwise been excluded. They can all now make 
their voice heard. 
In contrast to the bourgeois public sphere, the cultural public sphere is emotion-
dependent in that it simultaneously allows for: emotional expression, emotional 
experimentation and emotional engagement. 
McGuigan  summarizes best the role played by the cultural public sphere in 
contemporary societies: 
Why should people be expected to treat official politics where they have so little power to 
influence what happens, with the same passion that they devote to their personal lives and 
lived or imagined relationships to others? In actual fact (…) keen popular engagement in 
something like a public sphere, (…) takes a predominantly affective mode, related to the 
immediacy of lifeword concerns, instead of the cognitive mode normally associated with 
experience of a remote, apparently unfathomable and uncontrollable system. 
(2005: 435) 
Since the cultural public sphere accommodates for all categories of people, a 
legitimate question could be raised here, namely, what would be the best facilitator 
for all these human interactions? As Habermas  himself admits:  
when the public is large this kind of communication requires certain means of 
dissemination and influence: today newspapers and periodicals, radio and television are 
the media of the public sphere.  
(1997: 105) 
It is only in the mass media that vast populations of people can come together to 
exchange ideas. But the media leads to trivialization, spectacle and fragmentation of 
the public sphere (see McKee 2005: 5). If the media alone is said to erode Ŗthe 
adequacy of the public sphereŗ (van Zoonen 1991: 228), by opening the door to the 
affect into the cultural public sphere, fragmentation and alteration of the original 
concept would be final. At least, this is what the Habermasian preachers would have 
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us believe. Distorted forms of communication, commercialization of feeling, pollution 
of rationality by issues of individualřs identity, public expression of emotive secrets 
and emotional conflict would all render the public sphere as a form of uncensored 
spectacle. Furthermore, in the cultural public sphere of the mass public, open and 
rational debate of the traditional bourgeois public sphere has been entirely replaced 
by emotional expression and engagement. 
 
 
2. Logical vs emotional appeals in contemporary mediated debates 
 
As argued above, the media for the contemporary public sphere is mass media. It is 
mainly in the mass media that people can come together to exchange ideas, debate 
and deliberation. Nonetheless, peopleřs interaction is no longer a face-to-face 
encounter. It is rather a virtual participation that involves mediated forms of 
communication. In Habermasřs view, while critical journalism once raised people to 
debate, the todayřs media treat people as part of a media market and even 
administer the debate for them. 
In this part of the paper I will deal in more detail with the pros and cons of 
emotional and, rational appeals in the public sphere. Then I would like to focus on 
the beneficial effects of affect if not in the procedures of deliberation, at least in the 
process of eliciting participation and debate. 
Diachronically, it is easy to admit that Habermas is right when he claims that, in 
the public sphere, a decisive role is played by open and rational debate. In ancient 
times demagogues would often act as political agitators who appealed to the passions 
and prejudices of the mob in order to get the power to further his own interests (see 
McKee 2005: 113). Rational public debate is a defining feature of genuine 
democracies; it is the very move from absolute sovereign power to Řreason and 
persuasivenessř (Le Harpe, quoted in Habermas 1989: 96).  
Calhoun (1996) identifies the Řcriticalř character of rationality and notes that Ŗthe 
best argument was decisive, rather than the identity of its proponentsŗ (453). 
Habermas establishes an interdependent relationship between Řrationalř, Řcriticalř 
and Řpublicř and shows that only critical discussion can really be rational; only 
critical rational discussion can really be public (Habermas 1989: 248; Habermas 
1997: 106). 
There has been much academic debate concerning the emotional vs. logical 
appeals in public debate. Some scholars are in favor of public debates by spectacular 
forms of communication: visual, emotional or personal, whereas some other scholars, 
including Habermas, support the opposite, namely, that in public debates the forms 
of communication need to be logical, restrained and literate. As an example I would 
like to mention Copi and Cohen () who worry that using emotional rather than 
logical appeals in public debate enable propagandists and demagogues: 
The appeal to the emotion: argument Ad Populum. This common fallacy (…) (literally Řto 
the peopleř and by implication to the mobřs easily aroused emotions) is the device of every 
propagandist and demagogue. It is fallacious because it replaces the laborious task of 
presenting evidence and rational argument with expressive language or other devices 
calculated to excite enthusiasm, excitement, anger or hate.  
(1998: 169) 
Copi and Cohen mention Hitler as a common example in such arguments. More 
than that, Ŗthe Nazi had aestheticized politics with their glowy displays and affective 
appeal.ŗ (McGuigan 2005: 430) At the opposite site, there is another group of 
scholars, mainly popular philosophers, who look at the Nazi regime and warn 
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against the dangers of Řunemotionalř forms of public communication (see McGuigan 
ibid: 430-431; McKee 2005: 113-114). They look at the Nazi regime and see a 
warning about the dangers of logic devoid of human feeling. Such an ambivalent 
attitude towards emotion and logic in public debate stem from a fairly ambiguous 
taxonomy of the term Řrationalř. 
Perhaps Nicholson summarizes best the binary meaning encapsulated in the 
word Řrationalityř. Thus he speaks about  
an ambiguous legacy concerning (…) the meaning of Reason (…) reason in modern Western 
societies has been understood as a faculty exercised only by some, some of the time, when 
achieved by proper training, disciplining of the emotions and exposure to specific kinds of 
information. Ideally, one individual who is trained, disciplined and appropriately informed 
could practice reason in its pure form. This individual would then be in a position to access 
truth (…) At the other end (…) exists a view of reason as a much more mundane faculty 
(…) [and which] is exercised not all that differently by most human beings most of the 
time. According to this view, the biases that reflect the specificities of our respective 
locations (…) can sometimes function as a resource, providing a diversity of perspectives 
(…) the other non-rational parts of the psyche, such as the emotions (…) at times (…) even 
improve us.  
(1999: 10-11) 
Reason and rationality have been identified by Habermas and his followers as 
the engine of democratic societies. Copi and Cohen  claim that 
(…) non-rational grounds for judgment may prove catastrophic [for] (…) the success of 
democracy depends, in the end, upon the reliability of the judgments we citizens make, and 
hence upon our capacity and our determination to weigh arguments and evidence 
rationally. 
(1998: xix, xx) 
Following this train of thought, Guttenplan (1997: 12) shows that, in the public 
sphere, rational arguments are to be preferred, even if they are not good instruments 
and prove less effective in persuasion.  
Habermas has already drawn a clear-cut distinction between Řthe better 
argumentř, which he favors and Řthe argument which convinces a given audience at a 
given timeř which he disapproves of due to its content-dependent content. The fallacy 
of argument ad populum, the appeal to the people, is to be avoided at all costs. In 
Habermasian thinking, it is wrong to use ad populum argument because it is too 
successful and persuades people too well, appealing to the masses Řeasy aroused 
emotionsř.  
Douglas Walton (1989: 85-86) takes this argument further and claims that 
rational argument works best with Řthe intelligent consumerř, while Řan appeal to 
popular sentimentř works better for informally educated audiences. In public 
debates, rational argument must be the sole arbiter of any issue (see Calhoun 1992: 
13) as it is the best form of communication, particularly for reasons of equal 
participation. 
Going back to the cultural public sphere, a public sphere for the mass public, it is 
obvious that presenting logical and rational arguments is not enough. In order to 
bring people together, elicit debate and deliberation and, finally, help them with the 
opinion process formation, emotion needs to play an important part in the cultural 
public sphere. 
As van Zoonen (2004: 39) points out, emotions are intrinsically linked to 
rationality and Ŗlead Ŕ in concert Ŕ to Řaffective intelligenceř.ŗ In Popa (in press), I 
have tried to show that affective communication contributes to public participation 
and expression, and information diffusion in the particular case of cultural public 
sphere. In Romania, a country where capitalism and democracy are gradually 
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regaining their pre-World War status, and where changes in political life call for a 
change in the hierarchy of values, soap opera emerges as a convenient vehicle for 
initiating reflexive thinking and affective communication. As long as today some 
Romanians may make their voice heard in the cultural public sphere, just like the 
bourgeoisie did in the press or the arts in the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism, we need to accept that such forms of manifestation, like the soap opera, 
are elementary in the achievement of equality and freedom of expression (ibid). It is 
also worth pointing out here that by problematising society and private life, the soap 
opera succeeds in making their problems visible. 
Another specific genre of the cultural public sphere, equally controversial in 
status, is the talk show. Just like the soap opera, the talk show has often been 
dismissed as irrelevant and meaningless Řtrash television.ř 
Livingstone and Lunt (1994) suggest though that talk shows are a candidate for 
an oppositional public sphere, emphasizing the expression of interested points of 
view that give voice to participantsř perspectives and aim at compromise rather than 
consensus. 
Gamson (1999), instead, suggests that we should be aware of the fact that talk 
shows provide an institutionally constrained space that nevertheless offers the 
opportunity for expression of original voices, just like in the case of the soap opera, I 
might add, that would otherwise not be heard in public:  
For those who have traditionally been defined as outside of public discussion, whose lives 
were, until recently, kept private by both choice and coercion Ŕ people marginalized on the 
basis  of gender, sexual, nonconformity, economic status, educational status, physical 
ability, race, and so on Ŕ talk shows have been a crucial site of entry into public view and, 
at least to some degree, public conversation. 
(Gamson 1999: 195) 
In fact, there is a growing body of literature dealing with the issue of the talk 
show and its affinities with everyday conversation (see Goffman 1981, Tolson 2001, 
Thornborrow 2001). Scholars in the field have already identified several different 
forms of talk shows. For instance, Lunt and Stenner (2005: 62) identify three 
different show formats: 1) shows that focus on public discussion of issues of concern; 
2) shows that take an explicitly therapeutic approach to personal problems; 3) shows 
that focus on conflict and emotive secrets. 
The most important formats for the particular case of cultural public sphere are 
the last two ones. In such shows, emotional expression plays an important role in 
authenticating the accounts of participants and, also, in revealing the debth of 
feeling necessary to therapeutic talk shows. 
In the Romanian setting, talk shows like 9595 (Antena 1), 9409 and 1001 (both 
from Romantica TV) are shows that openly encourage, manage and reflect upon 
emotional involvement and expression in a public context. In these examples, 
however, emotionality is precisely rendered subordinate to a primarily 
communicative end in both the public discussion-based and therapeutic talk shows. 
Nonetheless, as Lunt and Stenner (2005: 64) note, Ŗwhile emotional expression plays 
a key role in these agendas, there remains the constant danger that excesses will 
disrupt the communicative ends of discussion or therapeutic intervention.ŗ There is 
a different reason for concern as far as such emotion-based communicative 
manifestations is concerned, namely, their authenticity. 
As Aslama and Pantti (2006: 170) rightly point out, there are instances during a 
talk show when Ŗallegedly authentic displays of emotion emerge, confirmed by tears 
or other bodily signs of true feelings.ŗ Yet, more often than not, such displays are 
merely commodified emotive confessions Ŗworking to entertain and attract ratings.ŗ 
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(ibid.) As a consequence, talk shows become a form of mediated public participation 
working by setting a scene with participants, pops and a script. Every step is Řtaken 
care ofř: the taking of turns, the interplay between guests, the attitude and 
commentaries of the host and audience. 
It is worth pointing out here that an important aspect of the bourgeois public 
sphere is that Ŗit constitutes an elision of disinterestŗ (Lunt and Stenner 2005: 68). It 
means that private people would gather, conduct their conversations on public 
matters and then return to their private lives. Such limited encounters would 
therefore enable Ŗrelatively rational and impartial discussions of cultural and 
political issues.ŗ (ibid) The commercialization of the mass media, however, made it so 
polluted Ŗby the twin need of promotion and the need to create a readership that 
they cease to provide a relatively neutral resource for the development of public 
opinion.ŗ (ibid: 69) It follows that publicity of both private and public interest have 
completely altered the potential for a mass-mediated public sphere in ideal 
Habermasian terms. 
 
 
Final remarks 
 
We live in a heterogeneous society that, in order to function properly needs to 
develop a nexus of several co-existing publics that could adapt to the ever-changing 
needs of evolving democracies. While, undoubtedly, critical rational thinking and 
debate would be, ideally, the path to follow, I have tried to briefly show that, 
emotion, plays its part in one of the parallel public spheres, namely, the cultural 
public sphere. Unfortunately free emotional expression does not come without a 
price. As shown above, it often involves amplification and exposure to private 
emotive secrets and emotional conflicts, institutionalization of public expression, 
questionable authenticity of interaction that may, at times, turn into certainty about 
the untruthfulness of interaction as a therapeutic mechanism and, last but not least, 
public sphere as a form of entertainment spectacle. This reminds me of Mestrovicřs 
(1997: 87) statement: ŖAlmost every hour of the day, Americans and other 
Westerners can tune into a television program that either offers some sort of self-
help therapy or presents someone confessing how they engaged in or overcome drug 
abuse, rape, adultery, obsessions, psychotic symptoms, or whatever.ŗ 
I would like to conclude by saying that although commercialization, privatization 
and trivialization of the mediated public sphere have often reached their limit, 
democracy, by definition, means social equality and a world governed by its people. 
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Notes 
  
[1] The present study has been entirely supported by the postdoctoral DISCORPS CEEX PD 17 
/ 2006 Project, financed by the Romanian Ministry of Education, Research, and Youth. Special 
thanks go to Prof. Dr Anca Gâţă, the coordinator of the project, for insightful discussions and 
suggestions. 
[2] Peters (1993: 542-543) and Warner (2002: 47) suggest that the phrase Řpublic sphereř is an 
unfortunate artifact of translation as the German Öffentlichkeit lacks the spatializing 
metaphor and suggests merely Řopennessř and Řpublicnessř. It thus relates only to going public 
and not to public relations. 
[3] It is ironic that the Habermasian conceptualization of the public sphere was far from being 
ideal or democratic as it did not include women or people from lower social classes, a point 
acknowledged by Habermas himself. Conversely, some scholars argue that even though we 
have now expanded the public sphere to include women and people from all social classes, we 
are left with a social system where the public does not matter. (see Elliott 1982, Carey 1995) 
[4] The cultural public sphere is the term coined by McGuigan (2005) to refer to the articulation 
of politics, public and personal, Ŗas a contested terrain through affective-aesthetic and 
emotional modes of communication.ŗ 
[5] In his Structural Transformation, Habermas makes the distinction between the literary 
public sphere and the political public sphere. Although not completely separate from one 
another, their functions are distinct. Oversimplifying, we could say that whereas the political 
public sphere focused on transient news with instantaneous political impact, the literary public 
sphere was more concerned in reflecting upon the chronic and persistent problems of life and 
art. 
[6] Due to the importance and value changes, there is a doubt that today we may still talk 
about genuine debates in our societies. (for a detailed account see Garnham 1990: 125, McKee 
2005: 18) 
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